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Abstract: 
This paper examines the genesis of liberalisation in India, it argues that once we 
locate its origin we can understand its direction and underlying political economy 
with much greater clarity.  In particular the paper seeks to answer three questions.  
Why was reform launched in 1991 when the real economy was essentially in good 
condition?  Why did the state choose a neo-liberal policy package when other options 
were available?  Why did the state sustain liberalisation even after the economy had 
recovered from the immediate crisis?   Existing answers to these questions are found 
to be inadequate.  Instead this paper focuses on an alternative explanation that 
emphasises continuity, the reforms in 1991 can be traced back to the early 1970s.  The 
Momentum of reform was sustained and assumed a particular form due to an 
underlying ‘logic of capital’. 
 
January 2004. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Neo-classical economics is based, as is any school of economics on certain 
assumptions.  The underlying assumptions that a free-market removes politics from 
the economy; that a free market leads to an efficient allocation of resources and 
efficient growth over time.   Such assumptions have served to narrow its analytical 
perspective.  With such strong assumptions Neo-classical analysis is limited to 
accounts chronicling implementation, focusing on the depth, speed and sequencing of 
policy reform.  Analysis is seldom concerned with the impact on productivity, on 
employment, and poverty.  With such strong a-priori efficiency assumptions the only 
barometer of success is the degree to which liberalisation has been implemented.  
Typical for example are accounts of trade liberalisation, which focus only on the 
extent to which tariffs have been reduced, and foreign investment liberalised.  There 
is little if ever attempt to measure the impact of such reforms on crucial issues of the 
economy and of economic welfare.  This paper focuses on one such issue ignored by 
Neo-classical discourse, using the case study of India in the 1990s.  This paper 
examines the genesis of liberalisation in India and argues that once we locate its 
origin we can understand its direction and its underlying political economy with much 
greater clarity. 
 
This paper begins with the accession of Rajiv Gandhi to the Presidency of Congress in 
1984.  It was perceived to mark a new beginning, despite obvious dynastic 
continuities.  Early reform efforts were met with initial acclaim though the impetus 
was perceived to quickly peter out, and finally reforms were abandoned by 1986/87.  
There was a remarkable sense of resignation by the end of the 1980s.  The socio-
political configuration of India, analysed in both state and society terms meant 
substantial reform in the near future would be impossible. 
 
Reforms launched in 1991 were greeted with euphoria, considered unambiguous and 
perceived to herald a transformation of India’s development strategy.  This was 
somewhat surprising given the then academic consensus that they were all but 
impossible. 
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Analysis has identified what can be described as episodes of liberalisation, these have 
occurred on a fairly regular basis, in 1945/47, 1965/66, 1980/82 and 1985/6.  
According to orthodox opinion these were isolated episodes with no long-term 
implications.  Thus we are posed with three questions. 
 
Why was reform launched in 1991 when the real economy was essentially in good 
condition? 
 
Why did the state choose a neo-liberal policy package when other options were 
available? 
 
Why did the state sustain liberalisation even after the economy had recovered from 
the immediate crisis? 
 
This paper identifies four arguments that authors have used seek to answer these 
questions, ‘Elite verses Mass Politics’, ‘Reform by Stealth’, ‘Clever Political 
Management’ and ‘Elite Psychology’.  In all cases they do not address the important 
issue of why reform failed in 1985 and succeeded in 1991, nor why liberalisation was 
initiated or took the particular form that it did. 
 
Instead we turn to an alternative interpretation that emphasises continuity.  That the 
reforms launched in 1991 were not new but instead part of a continuing coherent 
process encompassing the reforms of Rajiv that can be traced back to the early 1970s.  
The momentum of reform was sustained and assumed a particular form due to an 
underlying ‘logic of capital’.   
 
Analysis since 1991 has all too often focused on the politics of reform, how interest 
groups may block reform, or how the reform process may be speeded up.  This 
approach misses the essential nature of the reform process, that the logic of capital is 
driving a particular pattern of inegalitarian development.  Reforms have been driven 
by the greater availability of international capital, a process that gathered momentum 
in the 1970s and 80s.  The release of the financing constraint on India’s balance of 
payments in turn allowed much greater leniency in the domestic budget.  Debt 
accumulation provided a palliative to the preceding twin evils of inflation or payments 
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crises that characterised the stop-go process of economic development in an earlier 
period. 
 
The need to attract capital, international rather than domestic resource mobilisation, 
promoted a particular logic of reform.  Reform focused on attracting NRI deposits and 
FDI and liberalising capital markets.  However the state in India is not a 
developmental state.  Capital drove reform but the state was ultimately unable to 
utilise capital to underpin its own legitimacy.  Capital was not absorbed productively.  
FDI was aimed at the domestic market or short-term portfolio assets.  In China by 
contrast MNC’s account for 40% of China’s manufactured exports (Kumar, 2000).  
Driven by a particular ‘logic of capital’ the sustainability of an exclusionary and 
speculative reform process must be questioned. 
 
 
2. 1985: Change in the Guise of Continuity 
 
The accession of Rajiv Gandhi to the Presidency of Congress in 1984 marked the final 
subordination of the party to the dictates of the Nehru family.  Paradoxically however, 
this dynastic continuity was acclaimed because it was perceived to mark a distinct 
break with the past. 
 
“Rajiv was forty when he became Prime Minister.  His sheer paucity of years was as 
audacious as the fact that he had almost none of the traditional exposure to 
politics……The fact that he was not a ‘professional’ politician was his biggest 
asset……His youthful years promised a dynamism…..He was perceived to be free of 
the baggage of old ideology, pragmatic, with an open mind” (Varma, 1998, p112). 
 
Acceptance of Rajiv was underpinned by an implicit rejection of his political heritage.  
The post-Independence leadership had inspired a generation through, 
 
 “an aura of personal sacrifice, a long association with politics in the struggle for 
freedom, an unambiguous set of ideological beliefs, a professed disdain for material 
pursuits, and unquestioned personal integrity.” (Varma, 1998, p112). 
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 The mandate for a new beginning was striking, with 48% of the national vote 
Congress won 401 of the 535 seats in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections.  Rajiv secured 
the largest ever majority in India, surpassing Congress ‘one party dominance’ in the 
1950s and even Indira’s ‘Garibi Hatao’ populism of the early 1970’s.  This mandate 
was reinforced by a perception that change was now genuinely possible. 
 
“The state suddenly stood autonomous, seemingly free of societal constraints, ready 
to be used as a tool for imposing economic rationality on the sosciety.” (Kohli, 1990, 
p317). 
 
 
2.2 Economic Reform 
 
The Budget presented by VP Singh on 24th March 1985 marked a clear shift in official 
priorities1.  Corporate, wealth and income taxes were reduced and estate duty 
abolished.  Regulatory and tariff changes permitted more liberal imports of capital 
goods, technology and raw materials to enable industry to modernise and expand 
exports.  Industrial policy was overhauled.  Restrictions on monopolies were 
reduced2, easier access granted for expansion and diversification3 of production.  
Twenty-five broad categories of industry were delicensed4. In June 1985 a new textile 
policy, removed output restrictions on mills and power looms.  This measure struck at 
the symbolic heart of Congress nationalist values.  For the first time since the 1950s 
private sector investment outlays were expected to exceed those of the public sector.   
 
 
2.3 1986: The Return of Continuity 
 
The perception of change did not last long,  
                                                          
1 (Rubin, 1985 p942). 
2 The MRTP (Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practises Act) dated from the ‘radical’ period of Indira 
Gandhi, 1969-73.  In the 1985 budget the asset limit for referrals to its requirements was raised from Rs 
20 to Rs 100 crore.  Industries were also exempted if established in backward areas. 
3 Known as ‘Broad-Banding’. 
4 Including electrical machinery, drugs and electronic components. 
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 “The illusion of autonomy and the euphoria of a new beginning lasted about six 
months.” (Kohli, 1990, p318). 
 
In February 1986 an announced price increase in petroleum products was reversed 
before planned national protests.  In the same month proposals to allow collaboration 
with Japanese automobile manufactures were dropped in the face of pressure from 
competing import substituting industries.  Rajiv’s popularity declined sharply during 
1986.  Congress lost nearly all state elections after March 1985.  Party elections 
planned for 19865, to revive the moribund party organisation were postponed.  There 
was a risk that elections would entrench growing opposition to Rajiv within the 
Congress.  
 
 
2.4 1987:  Business as Usual   
 
Rajivs electoral misfortunes culminated in the loss of the May 1987 Haryana state 
elections.  This was a dire setback in a traditional Congress stronghold.  In the same 
year the Bofors scandal erupted, Rajiv lost his untainted ‘Mr Clean’ image.  The 
failure to implement the 1985 Punjab peace accord led to spiralling terrorism, from a 
low in 1985 3,000 were killed in 1988. 
 
The 1987 Budget conformed to political considerations rather than continue pursuing 
neo-liberal reform. Customs duty on imported machinery imports were raised to 85%.  
Spending on anti-poverty programmes were boosted in 1987/8 from Rs 200 to Rs 
2050 crore.  Plan outlays on agriculture and irrigation were increased to head off 
growing discontent among the agrarian lobby.  The sense of stagnation and an 
opportunity lost are striking, 
 
“In a little less than five years, Rajiv and his bold men has dissipated the enormous 
political capital that they had inherited.  The society had struck back, and the 
Congress government had once again lost much of its autonomy.” (Kohli, 1990 p324) 
                                                          
5 Internal Congress party elections were cancelled by Indira Gandhi in the early 1970s and replaced by 
a practise of appointing loyalists by central dictat. 
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 “For a brief historical moment there was an opportunity for significant change.  That 
moment appears to have passed.” (Weiner 1989, p317). 
 
 
3. The Orthodox View:  Why Reforms Petered Out in 1986/7 
 
There are two shades to this orthodoxy, ‘society’ and ‘state’ centred.  Society centred 
explanations focus on the rise of new groups, especially the post Green Revolution 
peasantry, the deepening of political participation and consequent increasing demands 
on the limited resources of the state.  State centred explanations focus on the 
undermining of political institutions by the leadership6.   
 
 
3.1 Society Centred: A Summary 
 
Society centred approaches analyse the power of different groups to push through 
preferred policy choices.  Policy changes in the 1980s were not simply an objective 
response to an objective situation.  Alternatives did exist and were strenuously 
debated at the time. The early legitimacy of Ragiv was dynastic and not connected 
with any particular economic philosophy.  The choice of policy involved political 
choices. 
  
The literature7 has identified rough interest groups to which it has ascribed either 
support or opposition.  The balance of power between these contending parties 
variously couched in political, rhetorical or economic terms is held to determine the 
outcome of attempted reform. 
 
In Favour… 
 
Business is not a homogenous whole.  Liberalisation was opposed by the import 
substituting sector and welcomed by those benefiting from greater access to raw 
                                                          
6 Commonly telling a story of the rise and fall on political institutions under Nehru and Indira e.g. 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987). 
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materials and inputs at world prices, foreign markets and the opportunity to engage in 
joint ventures.  The middle classes, professionals and self-employed, those who 
identified with Rajiv, computers and consumer goods.  
 
Opposition….. 
 
Lower level political functionaries and the Congress rank and file, were faced with the 
loss of patronage resources.  The moderate left opposition argued liberalisation 
undermined both self-reliance and socialism.  For rural Groups Rajiv had acquired an 
urban and pro-rich image.  Formal sector labour, especially in the unionised state 
sector feared the loss of both employment and privileges.  
 
By 1985 the massive electoral victory secured by the ‘Rajiv wave’ did not generate an 
equivalent capacity to govern.  Since the 1970s elections had been won based on 
vague mandates8 subordinated to populist appeal.  The government was beholden to 
political wave effects associated with this decline in ideology.  There was in 1984 a,  
 
“broad, heterogeneous and hugely formidable array of interests to oppose 
liberalisation” (Manor, 1987, p39). 
 
The literature identifies a number of means by which opposition to the neo-liberal 
agenda could have been overcome.  Patel (1987) argues Rajiv failed to build up pro 
reform consensus to change the balance of power into one favouring liberalisation.  
Rubin (1985) focused on both the ability and will necessary to reassert the autonomy 
of ‘high politics’ from the dominant coalition opposed to liberalisation in order to 
impose upon them the costs of change.  It was argued would require a fundamental 
change in the functioning of democracy in India, 
 
“a real attempt to liberalise the economy probably would require the establishment of 
a much more authoritarian regime, able to ride over the powerful interests represented 
in the dominant coalition.” (Harriss, 1987, p38). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 E.g. Kohli (1990), Manor (1987), Harriss (1987) etc 
8 The theme of liberalisation was not an issue in the 1984 national election, Congress campaigned on 
the issue of ‘national unity’. 
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3.2 State Centred 
 
The state centred approach sees political structures having an autonomous 
significance in socio-economic life.  Weakened political institutions in India 
encouraged undisciplined political competition and politicised existing social 
divisions such as caste, ethnicity and language.  There was a growing gap between 
institutional capacities and problems requiring political solutions.   
 
“A highly interventionist state dealing with a poor economy has become the object of 
intense political competition.  The spread of egalitarian political values and the 
opportunities provided by democracy have, in turn, helped to transform what was 
once a heterogeneous social structure into many groups of mobilised activists.” 
(Kohli, 1990, pix). 
 
The literature identifies two themes that could further the chances of neo-liberal 
reform.  Kohli (1990) identifies the CPI(M) in West Bengal and the DMK in Tamil 
Nadu to demonstrate the potential of party reform to further a programmatic policy 
agenda.  Party organisation in these states has filled the authority vacuum created by 
competitive political mobilisation, has minimised factional conflicts, clarified lines of 
authority, defined policy priorities and provided cohesive and effective govt. 
 
Congress in 1985 did not have internal elections.  Party and state leaders were 
appointed by the centre on the basis of loyalty not local level support. Local political 
structures had no independent capacity to deal with local problems.  Rajiv attempted 
to pursue reform along the lines identified by Kohli (1990), making some early 
announcements about holding internal party elections.  Within this approach analysis 
focuses to a large extent on the personal capacity of the leadership.  Unfortunately 
Rajiv was, 
 
“irresolute, maladroit, dismissive” ( Manor, 1987, p39). 
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The second line of reform, somewhat tautologically is liberalisation - to remove the 
state from the political arena and hence reduce the incentives for interest groups to 
gain control over it9.  The reasoning here is circular, liberalisation will reduce the 
problem of politics and enable the state to pursue an agenda of liberalisation! 
 
Under the state centred perspective reform seeks to narrow the gap between 
commitments and capabilities, liberalisation reduces the former and political reform 
raises the latter.  Rajiv made hesitant steps in both directions but was perceived to 
have ultimately failed.  The sense of resignation in 1989 was very apparent. 
 
 
4. A Sense of Resignation 1989 
 
Some authors concluded reforms were possible but more in hope than expectation,  
 
“A fundamental change toward market orientated policies requires a new ideological 
orientation of the governing elite, an economic and political strategy for handling the 
transition, a strong commitment by the leadership to pursue these policies in spite of 
short-term losses, and the capacity of the leadership to build a new coalition of 
political forces to provide support for these policies.” (Weiner, 1989, p149). 
 
A more common attitude was that the Indian state was not capable of pursuing a neo-
liberal agenda. 
 
“The country seems agreed ideologically on secularism, socialism and democracy, on 
the merits of a mixed economy10”. (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, p1) 
 
                                                          
9 Public sector employment reservation would have less relevance in a minimalist state which should 
reduce the clamour for caste based affirmative action. 
10 The most striking feature of Indian politics argue Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) is its “centrism” 
(p19) sustained among others by the presence of the state as a third actor marginalising class politics, 
the political consciousness of the ‘Bullock Capitalist’, electoral strength of minorities etc…It is this 
‘centrism’ that ultimately prevents liberalisation and stable party politics….“India has little to fear from 
the emergence of class politics; rather, centrism and populism are the primary sources of the problem 
on Indian politics.” (Kohli, 1990, p396). 
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As late as 1992 Jalan published ‘India’s Crisis: The Way Ahead’.  He considered that 
in mid 1991 the short term prospects for major reform appeared bleak. The February 
1991 budget was abandoned amidst political crisis, in March the minority government 
resigned without taking any effective action on the growing balance of payments 
problem.  The New Economic Policy of Rajiv, 
 
“might destroy the broad national consensus that characterised the evolution of 
India’s economic policy.” (Jalan, 1992, p21).  
 
As a consequence Jalan discusses moderate reforms – phased withdrawal of export 
subsidies, efforts at compensation (preserving subsidies on fertiliser and food), a more 
uniform tariff structure, greater use of replenishment licenses etc11.  Reforms 
explicitly within the context of the existing ‘national consensus’.  The degree to which 
popular discourse on liberalisation overtook Jalan while his book made its way 
through the publishers can be seen in the hastily written postscript at the end of the 
preface.  The postscript effectively confesses reforms underway had totally 
superseded his analysis. 
 
 
5. 1991: Euphoria 
 
Reforms in 1991 generated another burst of euphoria, similar to those sentiments 
prevailing in 198512.  Reforms were clear, 
 
“the reforms are forceful and explicit……[there is]…..no ambiguity of intention.” 
(Bhagwati, 1993, p84). 
 
And dramatic, few people had imagined that the economy, 
 
                                                          
11 A mechanism to provide an additional import facility for exporters based on the value of their 
exports. 
12 ‘The Economist’ March 23rd 1985 wrote that the budget, “tackles the red tape and draconian taxes 
introduced by his mother and grandfather….take India a big step away from the days when bureaucrats 
rather than businessmen decided its investment plans.” 
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 “would be transformed in its basic orientation in a matter of a few years.” (Sachs et 
al, 1999, p13). 
 
It marked, 
 
“a fundamental transformation of India’s economic strategy.” (Varshney, 1999, 
p230). 
 
Optimism knew few bounds, India needed, 
 
“merely an appropriate policy framework to produce the economic magic that 
Jawaharlal Nehru wished for his compatriots.” (Bhagwati, 1993, p98). 
 
Orthodox opinion shifted neatly from resignation to euphoria within a matter of 
months.  This dramatic u-turn has been little noticed, little discussed and its 
implications ignored amid a deluge of discussion about the future of liberalisation 
policies.  The genesis of reform has been all but forgotten. 
 
 
6. 1991 Reforms: A Summary 
 
In July 1991 there was two step devaluation of the rupee combined with a removal of 
many export subsidies.  Quantitative restrictions were largely removed except for 
consumer goods and agricultural commodities.  Tariffs fell from an average of 87% in 
1990, to 20.3% in 1997/8.  Some aspects of capital markets underwent a radical 
transformation, others such as insurance remained initially untouched.  Obligations 
for the banking sector to hold large reserves of government securities were diluted.  
Interest rates on lending and deposits were largely deregulated.  In 1994/5 private 
banks were licensed to operate.  Automatic licensing was permitted for foreign equity 
participation up to 51% in high priority industries.  As with the banking sector there 
was little direct privatisation.  The scope of the public sector became more narrowly 
subscribed.  Reservation for the public ownership was confined to eight not as 
previously, eighteen areas.  Industrial licensing was removed except for locational 
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reasons connected with city planning and pollution, barriers to entry under the MRTP 
Act were removed, and replaced by an emphasis on unfair business practises and 
consumer protection.  During this early period there was little attempt made to pursue 
reforms in the areas of direct privatisation13, agriculture or labour laws. 
 
 
7. In the Context of ‘Episodes of Liberalisation’ 
 
Ghosh (1998) called the debate over liberalisation in 1991 ‘An old drama in modern 
garb’.  The first ‘episode of liberalisation’ relates to the liberalisation of food controls 
from the early 1940s that had been extended into the early years of Independence.  
The second, to the period 1965/6 of agricultural failure and external shocks14, which 
prompted rupee devaluation and trade liberalisation.  The third to the 1980s, the oil 
price shock, balance of payments trouble and eventual, IMF medium-term loan.  The 
fourth in 1991 was in response to the balance of payments and fiscal crisis. 
 
“In each period of major shift, the change in strategy has come about as a response to 
a particular constraint, whether if food, the balance of payments or the fiscal 
position.” (Ghosh, 1998, p300). 
 
 
8. 1991 Reforms and Some Puzzles 
 
According to this perspective, previous crises in 1965-7, 1973-5 and 1979-81 were 
met with short-term stabilisation without longer term structural adjustment.  The 1985 
period wasn’t preceded by crisis but likewise amounted to a brief and temporary 
‘episode of liberalisation’.  These are contrasted with the successful, unambiguous 
and sustained liberalisation after 1991.  An episode that went on and on….  This 
subdivision of Indian economic history raises three important questions. 
 
 
                                                          
13 The domestic capital market was only 1% of the total value of the public sector assets at historic cost, 
Jalan (1992). 
14 War with China in 1962, with Pakistan in 1965 and consecutive monsoon failures in 1965 and 1966. 
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8.1 No ‘Real’ Shock 
 
Unlike previous crises that in 1991 wasn’t preceded by a real shock.  The real 
economy was in a very healthy condition.  Industrial production was growing at an 
annual rate of 8%, agricultural production was at a peak. The dollar value of exports 
had increased by 14% p.a. between 1985/6 and 1989/90.  The immediate cause was 
the very vulnerable financial position of the state. The fiscal failure of the state during 
the 1980’s was profound.  The state fiscal deficit reached 10.5% of GDP by 1989/90, 
savings remained stagnant at 21% of GDP throughout the 1980s. Especially after 
1984/5 large current account deficits were financed by commercial borrowings, such 
as (subsidised) NRI deposits.  Total external debt rose from $18.7bn in 1980 to 
$56.3bn in 1989 or from 11 to 21.5% of GNP.  The debt service ratio (as a proportion 
of exports of goods and services) increased from 9.1% in 1980 to 26.3% in 1989.  
Almost the entire incremental deficit had been financed from commercial borrowing.   
Between September and November 1990, foreign exchange reserves fell by fifty 
percent, NRI15 deposits were being withdrawn during the first half of 1991.  When left 
with two months import cover and facing imminent default India turned to the IMF.  
The collapse of the USSR and commensurate growth in demand for aid had increased 
the stringency of IMF conditionality.  Why then had financial capital assumed such an 
important position in 1991, in a manner bearing little relation to the real economy? 
 
 
10.2 Why Liberalisation? 
 
The experience of failed reforms and dramatic electoral repudiation of Rajiv by 1989 
provided a salient lesson that popular opinion was against liberalisation. No 
democratic politician should have wished to be associated with a neo-liberal agenda.  
The state was not becoming more authoritarian by the early 1990s16 but dissolving 
into a series of messy and chaotic minority governments ever more dependent on 
populist small state level and regional parties. Liberalisation has never been the only 
                                                          
15 Non-Resident Indian’s (NRI) deposits were well subsidised but this fiscal favour did not instil any 
degree of fiscal patriotism. 
16 A precondition for reform noted by Harriss (1987). 
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option available in the context of a balance of payments crisis17.  Why then 
liberalisation in 1991? 
 
 
10.3 Why was Reform Sustained? 
 
Why did the leadership sustain liberalisation?  A minority government sustained 
reform after 1991 while a government with a three-quarters parliamentary majority 
was unable to do so long after 1985.  The crisis was after all short-lived, the Gulf War 
oil shock lasted only six months and there was subsequently a rapid rise in foreign 
exchange reserves. Changes of government to left in 1996 and right in 1998 did not 
change the general direction of reform.  There was no discredited authoritarian regime 
failure to place blame upon.  The same party was in power in 1991 as for most of 
Independence period.  There had been slow economic growth after the mid-60s but no 
catastrophic excesses like the Chinese Great Leap Forward18 or Latin American lost 
decade.  There was no attempt to galvanise the nation in support of reforms, to project 
a vision in order to change the structure of interest groups.  The government was, 
 
 “unable, or unwilling, to make a clear ideological statement in favour of market 
orientated reforms in electoral or mass politics.” (Sachs et al, 1999, p14). 
 
Why do we see the neo-liberal agenda being pursued in India long after the need for 
stabilisation had subsided? 
 
 
10.4 An Aura of Inevitability 
 
Thus by the logic of analysis existing in 1990 and aura of inevitability hung over the 
possibility for reform.  There was no crisis of the real economy.  No politician would 
undermine his own career by supporting liberalisation.  At the most a short crisis in 
                                                          
17 Witness the recent imposition of capital controls and avoidance of an IMF package by Malaysia after 
the 1997 Asian crisis. 
18 Yang (1993) argues the catastrophe of the Great Leap created an important legacy for the 
psychological mindset of the Chinese leadership that had a profound effect on post-Mao economic 
reforms. 
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1990/91 would be met by another ‘episode of liberalisation’ and quick return to 
business as usual.  The state in 1990/91 was incapable of re-orientating the policy 
regime.  This depressing inevitability did allow a certain eloquence amidst the gloom.  
 
“When diverse elements of the loose and uneasy coalition of the dominant proprietary 
classes pull in different directions and when none of them is individually strong 
enough to dominate the process of resource allocation, one predictable outcome is the 
proliferation of subsidies and grants to placate all of them” (Bardhan, 1998, p61, my 
italics). 
 
However, between 1990/91 and 1995/96 total subsidies as a percentage of GDP fell 
from 3.5 to 2.8%, fertiliser subsidy from 0.8 to 0.68% (Jenkins, 1999, p23). 
 
There are four strands to explain liberalisation in 1991… 
 
 
10.5 Elite Verses Mass Politics (Varshney, 1999). 
 
It is a little difficult to pin down Varshney, whether reforms were elite concerns and 
of no relevance to the mass of the population; whether maintaining a united front 
against the BJP took precedence over divisions concerning the neo-liberal agenda; or 
instead events of greater significance distracted popular attention.  Varshney 
distinguishes ‘elite debates’, conducted within institutions such as the bureaucracy, 
parliament and the pink (English language business) press and ‘mass politics’, 
conducted instead on the streets through agitations/  demonstrations.  Whether an 
issue enters mass politics and hence becomes of electoral significance depends 
variously on the number effected, how groups are organised and whether the effect 
impacts in the short-run.  Within this context Varshney argues reforms after 1991 
were essentially elite concerns focusing on liberalising capital markets and the trade 
regime19.   
 
                                                          
19 The trade ratio in India is low, so such reforms do not have a short-run impact on mass welfare.   
That reforms could have a significant impact through political and ideological concerns, even among 
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This distinction can explain the persistent failure to tackle fiscal deficits, restructure 
labour laws, privatise state owned enterprises or reform agriculture.  Such changes 
have the potential to bring ‘reform’ into mass politics.  Economic reforms were thus 
non-issues in both the 1996 and 1998 elections giving policymakers space to pursue 
the neo-liberal agenda. 
 
The distinction between elite and mass concerns does grasp at an essential kernel of 
the truth.  The reforms of the 1990’s did follow a particular logic, but as an 
explanation of why reforms were successful in 1991 and failed in 1986/7 it is 
inadequate.  The reform programme was a continuation of that pursued under Rajiv in 
its essentials.  Focusing on industrial and capital market liberalisation and easier 
access to imported inputs and capital goods.  The tags given to Rajiv, as an urban, 
middle class consumer orientated administration reveal his reform shared the same 
essentially elite concerns as those after 1991.  The distinction thus does not highlight 
any essential difference between the two periods.  
 
Varshney has another angle, that the difference in the political context of the two 
reform periods was critical. By 1990, Indian politics had become triangular with the 
BJP, Congress and Janata Dal (in alliance with various left factions) competing for the 
highest office.  Between 1950 and 1990 it had been essentially bipolar, Congress and 
others.  Between 1990-7 found Communists, the lower castes and Janata Dal formed 
alliances with Congress against the BJP.  Hindu nationalism was perceived to be more 
of a threat than economic reform.   This was especially true after the Babri Mosque 
demolition in December 1992. Only the CPM consistently voted against reforms 
between 1991-3.  Turning this logic on its head we may ask why wasn’t Congress 
forced to compromise on economic reform in order to preserve an anti-BJP alliance 
Varshney (1999).  The defining feature of the Indian polity was an eclectic opposition 
to liberalisation.  
 
Varshney again changes track, now arguing the electorate were distracted by other 
events; massive Hindu-Muslim upheaval, caste based affirmative action, insurgencies 
in Kashmir and Punjab, and the assassination of Rajiv.  Passions were aroused by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the ‘mass’ o f voters is conveniently ignored.  The political furore surrounding the 1966 devaluation 
being a case in point. 
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identity politics and this gave both room for and facilitated economic reforms in India.  
This was opposed to the ‘quiet years’ of 1985 and 1986, 
 
 “In a political context of this kind, when economic reforms were introduced, 
politicians could easily use the price of food, fertiliser and petroleum for mass 
mobilisation.” (Varshney, 1999, p249). 
 
The violent assassination of Indira, escalation of the conflicts in Assam and Punjab 
after a brief lull and peasant agitation throughout northern India hardly merited the 
placid label of ‘quiet years’.  Thus are the various strands of explanation from 
Varshney unsuitable to explain his central hypothesis that reforms succeeded in 1991 
where they failed in 1986/7.  However his focus on reforms having a certain unifying 
consistency does have merit as we shall see. 
 
 
10.6 Reform by Stealth (Jenkins, 1999) 
 
Bardhan (1998) argued there was an acute difficulty of collective action for the 
dominant proprietary classes that characterised the large and heterogeneous ruling 
coalition in India.  However, mutual antagonisms within and between dominant 
propertied classes mean they are in fact less able to organise concerted resistance to 
reform. Jenkins (1999) argues that a government taking the initiative may be able to 
exploit these divisions.  This turns the collective action dilemma on its head.  
Opposition is difficult when reform threaten groups individually and in different 
ways.  The prospect of re-alignment mean the state is able to carve out new 
constituencies in support of reform and continually divide opponents.  Jenkins 
additionally identifies two features of the Indian polity that aided reform, democracy 
and the federal structure. 
 
Indian democracy allows elites to gauge the strength of potential allies and opponents 
of reform.  Political leaders are better able to invest scarce political capital in 
narrowly defined political constituencies where political payoffs are greater, Jenkins 
(1999).  Jenkins does argue effectively that democracies are better at reform that was 
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suggested by the fundamentally gloomy prognosis at the end of the 1980s. But his 
argument remains a-historical.  He is not addressing the question of why reforms were 
successful in 1991 and failed in 1986/7.  His argument has a general relevance to 
democracies but doesn’t capture the historical specifics in India. 
 
Jenkins considers that political institutions can neutralise opposition to reforms by 
promoting longer time horizons and institutionalising bargains between competing 
groups.  Though this has relevance in a general sense it doesn’t explain how reform 
stalled in the 1985 parliament 75% of whom were Congress and revived in the 
fragmented unstable parliaments of the 1990s.  Narasimha Rao did not even have a 
parliamentary majority for the first half of his term.   
 
The division of power between the state and centre has, 
 
 “tended to quarantine political resistance to reform within the confines of state-level 
political systems.” (Jenkins, 1999, p5). 
 
And concurrently forced state governments to adapt to liberalisation by competing 
with each other for private investment no longer able to rely on the twin pillars of 
state led development and a central commitment to balanced regional development. 
 
Jenkins argues change was effectively cloaked in the guise of continuity that Indian 
politicians have not achieved autonomy from society through a vision of change, 
rather, 
 
“on the ritual intonation of developmental shiboleths to conceal reform’s radical 
implications and thereby re-assure those groups who may be threatened by them.” 
(Jenkins, 1999, p177). 
 
And on other occasions continuity has masqueraded as change.  The problem with 
such examples is that it is easy to find equally valid examples from earlier periods.  
An emphasis on continuity such as the expansion of rural poverty alleviation 
programmes under the JNRY or revival of the Panchayati Raj.  And also an emphasis 
on the dramatic theatricalities to divert political attention is hardly new.  On example 
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could be the detonation of a nuclear device at Pokharan on May 18th 1974, which 
conveniently diverted attention from the escalating JP movement.  However as a 
thesis that embraces the basic fact that reforms in India failed in 1986/7 while 
succeeding in 1991 the argument is a-historical.  Indian politicians were not less 
skilled in their various manipulative arts in 1985 than they were in 1991.  The scope 
for clever politics was in fact greater in 1985 when Congress did have a secure 
majority.  It would be a disservice to reduce the argument to a bland claim that 
Narasimha Rao was a better politician than Rajiv Gandhi, but in accepting the basic 
thesis of 1991 as a turning point it is to this the argument of Jenkins is inevitably 
shrinking.  
 
 
10.7 Clever Political Management (Manor, 1995) 
 
Manor (1995) is more explicit than Jenkins, his argument is not something to be 
teased from the text but one that is stated clearly from the outset.  Reforms were 
successful in 1991 because they were implemented in a clever manner. 
 
“Changes in policy have been announced in modest steps, but steadily, with 
something new every week or two.  In most cases, each innovation has affected only a 
limited sector of the economy and a small number of interests.  After one 
announcement which is liable to displease a particular set of interests, the government 
carefully postpones further steps which they may dislike for awhile, to let resentment 
dissipate.  Potential opponents of the reforms are thus picked off one at a time, in 
turns, to prevent them from uniting.”(Manor, 1995, p348). 
 
Rajiv was simply not as good a politician as his successor, 
 
“the problem lay not in external forces intruding on his autonomy, but in the former 
Prime Minister’s confusion and his chronic, indeed radical inconstancy.” (Manor, 
1995, p354). 
 
Whilst his successor Rao had an unwavering determination to sustain cautious 
economic reforms and has, 
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 “succeeded in maintaining the ‘autonomy’ of high politics since mid-1991.” (Manor, 
1995, p354). 
 
Despite such clever politics we find Congress stumbled to the same political defeat in 
1996 as it did in 1989 winning only 136 seats in the national parliament compared to 
197 in the earlier election.  And of Rao, the clever politician who overcame the 
problems encountered by Rajiv, he has in fact a  
 
“famous penchant for indecision” (Jenkins, 1999, p51). 
 
 
10.8 Elite Psychology (Bhagwati, 1993) 
 
Reform, argues Bhagwati was not solely due to crisis-induced compulsions.  Rather 
there had been a steady increase in understanding of the need for reforms throughout 
the 1980s.  It was a change in attitude at the top that explains the success of reforms in 
1991 the, 
 
“psychology of the leadership that took power in June 1991 must provide the ultimate 
compulsion for the reforms unleashed by it.” (Bhagwati, 1993, p83). 
 
The increase in tax yields despite lower rates under V.P. Singh was an, 
 
“early and visible success of great significance” (Bhagwati, 1993, p79). 
 
An internationalised Indian elite were increasingly able to appreciate the degree to 
which India had been marginalised in world economic affairs, had suffered twenty 
five years of slow economic growth and been unable to make significant reductions in 
poverty.  The awkward combination of a ‘superiority complex’ and ‘inferior status’ 
altered the mindset of those at the political apex.  India’s share of world trade had 
fallen precipitously from 2.4% in 1948 to 0.41% 1981.  Such a stark scenario led to a, 
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“widely shared and justified perception that her policies have been wittingly foolish.” 
(Bhagwati, 1993, p18). 
 
The trouble with this explanation, elements of truth in it no doubt as there are, is the 
whole question of timing.  Bhagwati undoutably believes there was a big bang in 
reforms in 1991 and that they contrast significantly with those under Rajiv which, 
 
“in retrospect, they amounted to an acquiescence in the regime and a mild attempt at 
moderating its worst excesses.” (Bhagwati, 1993, p80). 
 
Thus we find this change in the mindset of the elite being telescoped into a very short 
period of time.  Not only very brief it also seems a peculiar period in which the elites 
would finally despair and embrace liberalisation.  The share of world trade fell 
precipitously until the 1980s then steadied, stagnation since the 1960s had by the 
1980s given way to reasonably rapid rates of growth, India successfully avoided the 
1980s debt crisis and could now compare herself favourably to previous rivals.  Using 
the mindset of the elite to explain the difference in reform outcome between 1986/7 
and 1991 is essentially problematical. 
 
 
10.9 Continuity 
 
A crisis provides no guarantee a government will respond with neo-liberalism, in 
convincing interest groups that reforms are needed, or sustaining reforms once the 
moment of crisis has passed.  We need to turn away from the thesis that reforms failed 
in 1986/7 and succeeded in 1991 and instead emphasise continuity.   
 
Too often analysis of reform has focused on policy announcements from the apex, 
from New Delhi.  Interpreting a concentrated burst of announcements as an ‘episode 
of liberalisation’.  The changed rhetoric in the latter years of Rajiv has been 
interpreted as a hiatus in reform.  Analysis has not sufficiently recognised that policy 
change impacts on the real economy and society long after implementation.  Change 
in policy will interact with its socio-economic environment in a cumulative manner 
changing constituencies for further reform.  Reform is not about a series of isolated 
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moments or episodes of policy announcements but an ongoing dialectic between the 
economy and society. 
 
 
11. Momentum of Reform and the Logic of Capital 
 
The withdrawal of the state from the attempted nationalisation of the wholesale trade 
in wheat in 1974 marked a turning point in state economic policy20 and the high tide 
of state intervention, ownership and regulation of the economy.  The intellectual 
rationale for such a shift can be dated to the 1969 Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry 
Committee (Dutt Committee) 1969.  It concluded,  
 
“in respect of licensing, the Committee has firmly concluded that the system has 
failed on practically all counts, whether it was regional dispersal, import substitution, 
or the prevailing concentration of economic power.  Licensing could not even ensure 
the development of industries mainly according to plan priorities.” 
 
The failures it catalogued were legion, pre-emption of licenses by larger houses to 
prevent entry of rivals, failure of licensing to prevent growth in non essential sectors, 
minimal attainment of regional dispersal and so on21.  Between the mid-1970s and the 
death of Indira in 1984 the state was no longer perceived to be the engine of growth 
and policy was designed instead to facilitate private sector growth.  In 1980 forty core 
industries were allowed automatic expansion of capacity of up to 25% of capacity 
over a five-year period.  In 1982 an enlarged number of core industries such as oil 
exploration and power generation were opened to large industrial houses and foreign 
corporations.  Administered prices for pig iron were abolished those of cement 
partially decontrolled and a more liberal policy on the import of raw materials, spare 
parts and technology established.  
 
Thus the New Economic Policy of Rajiv should be put into its context and seen as a  
 
                                                          
20 Paranjape (1985) dates this shift from 1973 with the announcement of a new industrial policy. 
21 Catalogued by Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975). 
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“more open and logical continuation of what was started in 1973” (Paranjape, 1985, 
p1516). 
 
Rajiv was able to give the appearance of initial impetus partly because he could 
accept many of the reformist conlusions of the Narasimham Committee (licensing 
controls) and the Hussain Committee (trade liberalisation) which had presented their 
reports by the time of his accession.  Significantly both were formed whilst Indira had 
still been in office.  The process was one more of continuity than change.  Even the 
supposed hiatus in liberalisation between 1986/7 cannot be exaggerated. 
 
“What is evident is that the earlier sidetracking of liberalisation in response to the 
regimes legitimation needs was only tactical, not strategic.” (Nayar, 1990, p106). 
 
The 1987 and 1988 budgets were undoubtedly concerned with legitimation.  By 1988 
liberalisation was once again being emphasised.  In March 1988 a second three year 
trade policy was announced to continue and deepen that begun in March 1985.  
Import licensing was further liberalised by weakening the indigenous availability 
clause for capital goods to boost the competitiveness of exports.  There were further 
dilutions for legal compatibility with the MRTP and FERA Acts.  The 1989/90 
Budget decontrolled prices in cement and aluminium industries completely. 
 
The NEP was not a break with previous policy, rather it was an evolutionary 
development.  There was continuity throughout the 1970s and 80s with respect to 
licensing, reservation limits and the gradual rise of the private sector as the ‘engine of 
development’.  The state gradually withdrew from its role as the linchpin of planned 
economic development, if not perhaps to one complementing the private sector with 
provision of education and infrastucture to one that obstructed it less through 
enforcement of regulation.  
 
 
 24
12. Not ‘Easy’ Reforms but a Particular Logic 
 
Sridharan (1993) drew up a ‘Political Cost-Benefit Structure’ of the reform process, 
highlighting the ‘typology’ - whether ‘benefits’ were gained in the short or long-term 
and ‘costs’, whether they were widely dispersed or concentrated.  Sridharan concludes 
general liberalisation would have short-term political costs while the gains in terms of 
efficiency and growth would only be realised in the medium to long-term.  Losses 
would be disproportionately concentrated on the well organised and the gains 
dispersed widely across the whole economy/ society.  This he argues accounts for the 
fact that liberalisation has advanced at different rates in different spheres.  This 
perspective is closely related to the consideration by Varshney (1999) of elite and 
mass politics.   
 
Once we consider the evolutionary continuity of reform we can characterise the bias 
of reform as not being characterised as ‘easy’ but by a particular ‘logic of capital’.  
The 1991 reforms combined an orthodox package of stabilisation measures in 
response to the twin problems of the budget and balance of payments deficits.  The 
reading by policymakers was conventional - that domestic fiscal deficits had spilled 
over into the balance of payments, that the root cause was domestic fiscal profligacy.  
The contrary argument that instead causality ran from the current account deficit to 
the public deficit is dismissed by Joshi and Little (1994) on account of there having 
been no external shocks impacting on the balance of payments between 1985/6 and 
1989/9022.  The events of Gulf War eventually comprised a moderate external shock 
of about 1% of GDP, this turned out to be temporary.  
 
“Conventionally a simplistic reading of what are national income identities, is used to 
suggest that the fiscal deficit is a determinant of the current account deficit.  But 
historically read, the Indian experience suggests that the ‘causality’, if it is 
unidirectional, runs the other way.” (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 1993, p667). 
 
Till the 1970s deficits on the current account was set by limited access to international 
capital.  This determined the stop-go policies of the Indian government. Expansion in 
                                                          
22 Examples would be a shift in the terms of trade caused by a dramatic change in the price of oil. 
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the form of increased plan outlays would soon spill over as excess domestic demand 
and prove inflationary.  This defined the inflation barrier of the Indian polity.  There 
was a distinct change in the circumstances of international capital after the oil price 
shocks in 1974 and 1979.  Transnational banks were flushed with recycled petro-
dollars and eager to lend. 
 
 “it appeared to render import-substituting as a strategy meaningless, since that 
strategy was prompted in the first instance by external vulnerability  and limited 
access to international finance.” (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 1993, p668). 
 
The original Mahalanobis-Nehru model had been underpinned by the assumption of 
limited access to international capital and consequent need for self-reliance.  Easy 
access to international capital by contrast prompted accelerated liberalisation in the 
1980s.  The constraint on non-inflationary growth was lifted,  
 
“the ability to finance a rising current account deficit on the balance of payments 
encouraged liberalisation on the one hand and fiscal profligacy on the other.” 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 1993, p668). 
 
Attention of policymakers and discourse shifted from domestic resource mobilisation 
to the state as facilitating the process indirectly.  A globalisation of resource 
mobilisation was made possible by changes in the structure of international capital 
and necessary to sustain domestic accumulation.  Capital market liberalisation, 
subsidies on NRI deposits and increasingly attractive and liberal terms for FDI were 
the policy response.  The broader forces of globalisation mediated by the balance of 
payments and budget deficit drove a particular form of liberalisation in India 
corresponding to essentially elite concerns.  Reforms,  
 
“in India have been prosecuted by or on behalf of social elites which have been in 
revolt against an earlier model of state directed economic development.” (Corbridge 
and Harriss, 2000, p145). 
 
There has been a long-term process of ‘reinventing India’ with its roots in the early 
1970s or even earlier, driven by a mutually reinforcing dialectic between the economy 
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and society and ‘logic of capital’.  We find there is an increasing tendency to consider 
the poor as responsible for their own plight (Varma, 1998) and at the same time a 
boom in middle class consumption.  The number of televisions increased from two to 
thirty million during the 1980s.   
 
Opening the market to capital before broadening the base of growth 23has increased 
the likelihood of an exclusionary growth strategy getting locked in.  The Brazilian 
experience writ large. 
 
“Reform is not just about re-negotiation of India’s relationships with global market 
place, or relations of private capital with the Indian state in the formal economy….the 
reforms are also about the reworking of the idea of the state itself and of the state’s 
capacity to work on behalf of those who stand outside India’s (expanding) social and 
economic elites.” (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000, p169). 
 
Discourse has remained beholden to state and society perspectives, according to 
Sridharan (1993) they offer complementary rather than contradictory frameworks.  
From this base, debate has focused on how best to first launch and then hasten the 
implementation of the neo-liberal project.  In India this has coalesced around 
discussion of what are termed ‘second generation reforms’ (Nagaraj, 2000), and more 
generally trailed off into the anaemic prescriptions of the ‘good governance’ agenda 
(Leftwitch, 2000).  Attention has systematically been diverted from the genesis of 
liberalisation in India.  The nature and specific unfolding of the process and its 
relation to power configurations within the economy and society of India. 
Patnaik (1994b) finds the retreat of the state in the context of large-scale capital 
inflows removes the one agency capable of converting them into productive 
investment.  Rising labour productivity is necessary to ensure the transformation of 
short-term portfolio investment into long-term bricks and mortar and higher 
productivity.  Instead the likely outcome is increasing growth of speculative capital 
flows at the expense of productive investment and continuing economic atrophy.  
Patnaik (1994a) demonstrates how the growth of financial capital has undermined the 
                                                          
23 Dreze and Sen (1996) argue participatory growth needs literacy beyond fifty percent.  Without social 
provision the vast majority will have no capacity to engage in the economic space opened up by 
liberalisation.   
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scope for Keynesian demand management, instead a general deflationary bias is 
necessary to placate wealth holders. 
 
The fragmented nature of the state has prevented the emergence of any developmental 
pact in India.  There is no-one for capital to negotiate with as an agent to enforce 
bargains.  Capital likewise has been unable to achieve any degree of class cohesion, 
capital has worked the system as individuals.  Selective capitals are welcome based on 
particularism - family, school or marriage.  What Herring (1999) calls ‘embedded 
particularism’ has prevented the sort of state-capital relationship that empowers the 
state to act against some in the interests of all.  Liberalisation offers no cure for 
‘embedded particularism’, in India there are yet no universalistic market criteria.  The 
neo-liberal project has followed the grooves of least resistance, a certain ‘logic of 
capital’, focusing narrowly on elite concerns, capital markets, NRIs and consumer 
durables. Their overall rationality and sustainability is questioned by (Patnaik, 1994a, 
b).  The political dangers of exclusionary growth that generates neither employment 
(despite the costs of more ‘flexible’ labour markets) or ameliorates nutritional 
deficiencies (Nagaraj, 2000) are evident. 
 
“If such an iniquitous growth process is not corrected – and corrected quickly – Indian 
society may have to pay a huge political price for it.” (Nagaraj, 2000, p2838) 
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